Who's Afraid of Deficits? Not Paul Krugman. (12/01/2008)

Today in the Times, Paul Krugman lends his Nobel-winning credibility to the argument for massive government spending in order to stimulate the economy. Yes, it will drive up the deficit in the short run. And, yes, fears of higher deficits led Bill Clinton to abandon his spending promises during the 1990s. But this is not the 1990s, Krugman reminds us. Back then, Clinton was worried that government borrowing would "crowd out" private investment, by driving up interest rates. Today, interest rates are ridiculously low.  Admittedly, this isn't the first time a prominent expert has made this sort of case. (It's not even the first time Krugman has made it.) But today's column does contain one important argument that's gotten relatively little attention: the fact that, twice before, governments tried balancing the budget to combat the sort of crisis we're experiencing today. Both times, the strategy failed. Krugman explains: The first took place in 1937, when Franklin Roosevelt mistakenly heeded the advice of his own era's deficit worriers. He sharply reduced government spending, among other things cutting the Works Progress Administration in half, and also raised taxes. The result was a severe recession, and a steep fall in private investment. The second episode took place 60 years later, in Japan. In 1996-97 the Japanese government tried to balance its budget, cutting spending and raising taxes. And again the recession that followed led to a steep fall in private investment. Just to be clear, I'm not arguing that trying to reduce the budget deficit is always bad for private investment. You can make a reasonable case that Bill Clinton's fiscal restraint in the 1990s helped fuel the great U.S. investment boom of that decade, which in turn helped cause a resurgence in productivity growth. What made fiscal austerity such a bad idea both in Roosevelt's America and in 1990s Japan were special circumstances: in both cases the government pulled back in the face of a liquidity trap, a situation in which the monetary authority had cut interest rates as far as it could, yet the economy was still operating far below capacity. And we're in the same kind of trap today--which is why deficit worries are misplaced. --Jonathan Cohn  克魯曼專欄》復甦優先 別怕債留子孫

【聯合報╱田思怡譯】 2008.12.02 02:41 am

美國政府應該下多猛的藥來救經濟，正引起激辯。包括我在內的許多經濟學家，呼籲祭出極龐大的財政擴張政策，以防經濟直線下滑。不過，其他人則擔憂會留給後代子孫龐大的預算赤字負擔。 但對赤字杞人憂天的人，根本搞錯了。以目前的情況，沒有拿短期利益換取長期利益的問題；強大的財政擴張政策，實際上會強化美國經濟的長期前景。 有關預算赤字長期來說會使經濟更糟的說法，是基於政府借貸會「排擠」（crowds out）民間投資的想法，也就是說，政府發行很多公債，導致利率上升，使企業不願花錢投資新廠和設備，接著造成經濟的長期成長率下滑。在正常情況下，這個主張有其道理。 但現在是非常時期。試想，如果歐巴馬政府屈服於赤字的鷹派，削減它的財政支出計畫，明年會發生什麼事。 這會導致利率下降嗎？肯定不會導致短期利率下降。短期利率多少掌控在聯邦準備理事會手中。聯準會已儘量把短期利率維持在最低水準，實際上已是零利率，除非看到經濟可能過熱的跡象，否則不會改變。而這種情況近期發生的可能性並不高。 那麼長期利率呢？長期利率已降到半世紀來的低檔，主要反映對未來短期利率的預期。撙節財政支出可能把利率壓得更低，但只能憑藉著創造經濟將長期大衰退的預期心理為之，但，這只會減少，不會增加民間投資。 在經濟蕭條時採取緊縮財政政策，會減少民間投資的想法，不只是假設的理論：史上有兩個重要時期確實發生過。 第一次發生在1937年，小羅斯福總統誤聽了當時對赤字杞人憂天者的建言，大幅刪減政府支出，其中一項是把工作進度管理署（Works Progress Administration，「新政」時期為失業者創造就業機會的機構）的預算砍掉一半，並且增稅。下場是經濟嚴重衰退，民間投資大幅下滑。 第二次發生在60年後，地點在日本。在1996-97年間，日本政府有意平衡預算，削減支出並增稅。又一次，隨之而來的經濟衰退導致民間投資大幅下滑。 我要聲明，我不是主張，意圖降低預算赤字總會對民間投資不利。你可以提出有力的例證，柯林頓在1990年代的財政節約，助長了那個10年蓬勃的民間投資，並有助於再創生產力的提升。 在美國小羅斯福時期和1990年代的日本，兩次都使撙節開支變成爛主意，兩次都是非常時期：這兩個例子都是政府面臨流動性陷阱（liquidity trap）時緊縮開支。流動性陷阱指的是主管貨幣政策當局儘可能降息，但經濟活動仍遠低於產能。 今天我們身陷同樣的陷阱，這是何以有關赤字的憂慮是杞人憂天。 還有一件事：如果大部分的財政擴張是採取公共投資形式，像是築路、修橋和發展新科技，這些都會使國家長期來說更富有，財政擴張甚至對美國的前景更好。 政府是否應永久採取背負龐大預算赤字的政策？當然不是。雖然公債不像許多人認為的那麼糟糕，這基本上是我們自己欠自己的錢，長期來說，政府和個人一樣，必須收支平衡。 但現在我們的民間支出根本不足：消費者重新發現儲蓄的美德，同時間，因過去過度擴張而受傷，並因金融體系的問題而受挫的企業，也減少投資。那個投資落差終將被填平，在此之前，政府支出必須接手，否則民間投資和整體經濟都將再重挫。 最後，那些認為今天的財政擴張對後代不利的人，是大錯特錯。對今天的薪水階級和他們子女的上上策，是竭盡所能，使經濟步上復甦。 【2008/12/02 聯合報】@ http://udn.com/